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Shrimp Export from Benin vs Food Safety in
Europe: Reconcilable Interests?
Kévine Kindji and Michael Faure*
In order to secure their fishery products market share in the EU, third countries, especially
the developing ones, tend to transplant EU requirements into their domestic legal order. In
reality, theses transplanted laws do not correspond to measures to reach a level of protec-
tion needed by the country of destination. Based upon the case of Benin, this paper intends
to show that when these legal transplants are adversely made, they can in some cases have
disastrous effects. It can be argued that an unintended result of EU policy was that it con-
tributed to the collapse of the shrimp industry in Benin. The paper moreover argues that de-
spite the stringency of the EU requirements, the implementation of its control policy might
inadequately protect European consumers of shrimp.
I. Introduction
The safety of fishery products has drawn much at-
tention in the EU regulatory process because they are
considered high risk products that must be handled
with a great deal of care to protect consumers from
potential harm. This imposition by the EU of very
strict sanitary and phytosanitary standards has not
gone undisputed. Some have argued that applying
these strict EU standards also on imports formally
serves tools of consumer protection as reiterated in
public debates, but de facto often has the hidden pur-
pose of protectionism1. This resulted over the years
in an EU policy strengthening legal standards which
could result in trade bans and border rejections for
third countries. Compliance with EU norms proves
especially difficult for developing countries. In real-
ity the levels of protection at both sidesmay vary sub-
stantially because in some developing countries,
there is no strong incentive to develop an intricate
food safety law to protect the domestic market. In
some African countries, economic development may
have a higher priority than food safety as a result of
which less emphasis is put on promoting strict safe-
ty standards. In view of these considerations, two
schools of thought have developed in the literature.
On the one hand, some authors support the view of
“standardsascatalysts” fordevelopingcountries,hav-
ing regard to the fact that compliance may serve for
upgrading production systems, thereby enhancing
quality and contributing to competitiveness2. For ex-
ample, some countries like Bangladesh3 and Sri Lan-
* Kévine Kindji is a PhD researcher at the Maastricht European
Institute of Transnational Legal Research (METRO) (the Nether-
lands) with a scholarship from Nuffic. Michael Faure is professor
of comparative and international environmental law at Maastricht
University and professor of comparative private law and econom-
ics at Erasmus School of Law (Rotterdam), both in The Nether-
lands.
1 This has been the case not only for fishery products, but the
suspicions refer more generally to most food of animal origin. See
for example Alasdair R. Young and Peter Holmes, Protection or
Protectionism? EU Food Safety and the WTO, in What’s the Beef?
The Contested Governance of European Food Safety, Christopher
Ansell and David Vogel eds, (2006) pp 281-306; Kathryn M.
Pace, EU Import Notifications as a Protectionist Move: an Exami-
nation of the Relation between Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers in
Seafood Trade, MSc thesis (2011), Tsunehiro Otsuki, John S.
Wilson and Mirvat Sewadeh, A race to the top? A Case Study of
Food Safety Standards and African Exports, World bank.
2 See for example Dianna DaSilva-Glasgow and Mark Bynoe,
Strategic Response to Evolving Food Safety Standards: A Case
Study of Guyana’s Fish Export, Estey Center Journal of Internation-
al Law and Trade Policy (2012), Vol 13 No 2, 201-215; Donna
Roberts and Laurian Unnevehr, Resolving trade disputes arising
from trends in food safety regulation: the role of the multilateral
governance framework, World Trade Review (2005) 469497; Luz
B. Diaz Rios and Steven Jaffee., Barrier, Catalyst, or Distraction?
Standards, Competitiveness, and Africa's Groundnut Exports to
Europe, Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper,
World Bank (2008) 1-83.
3 In 1997, the EU banned shrimps from Bangladesh for non-
compliances with its requirements. Although the shrimp export
sector suffered considerable losses as a result of the ban, subse-
quent compliance with HACCP principles enabled an increase
in exports. As reported by Yunus (2009), “From the second year
the accrued benefits far outweighed the annual costs of the
compliance and hence, justify the annual costs incurred. In the
long run HACCP compliance helped Bangladesh export addi-
tional US$ 35 million annually”. See Yunus, M., EU Ban, HACCP
Compliance and Shrimp Exports from Bangladesh. The
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ka4have successfullymanaged to improve their com-
pliance to EU food safety requirements, resulting in
increasedmarket access. On the other hand, support-
ing the view of “standards as barriers”, other authors
argue that export bans or high compliance costs re-
duce competitiveness and are strong trade impedi-
ments5. In Kenya, for instance, repeated EU bans
have resulted in a decline of 69%6 of fish exports and
led to a restricted access to EU market after exports
resumption7. Besides, while some countries adopted
a proactive approach in front of new stringent stan-
dards, the response of others has been rather reac-
tive and oriented towards adjustments through sig-
nificant regulatory changes.8 Within a proactive ap-
proach, the exporting country undertakes regulatory
changes ahead of time according to the future likely
evolvement of standards. In contrast, following a re-
active approach, a country would undertake regula-
tory changes only after new standards have ap-
peared, and require compliance. Although both
strategies entail regulatory changes, a proactive ap-
proach enables greater flexibility and time to choose
the best options according to domestic circum-
stances.
Developing countries in Africa often tend to posi-
tion themselves as victims of the EU sanitary mea-
sures, which compel them to transplant EU law into
their legal order.Moreover, because the standards are
evolutive, there is a constant threat of being banned
by failure to comply. In reality, the EU position is
seemingly rather simplistic: it checks whether the
third country has a legislation that conforms or is
equivalent to the one of the EU.9 Whether approval
to export to the EU is given or retained depends al-
so on the ability of the exporting country to imple-
ment the legislation through a well functioning and
organized control system.
Thispaperwill basically tell the storyof the shrimp
trade relations between Benin and the EU, and their
impact on food safety regulation in Benin. The analy-
sis points out that while Benin was aiming at export-
ing shrimp to the EU, it ended up importing EU
norms to satisfy EU requirements.
The goal of this paper is to present the case of
shrimp export from Benin to examine whether the
adverse effects observed are imputable to EU food
regulations. These adverse effects may not only have
consequences for exporters in developing countries,
but for EU consumers as well, since the effectiveness
in the implementation of the EU policy can, as we
will show, also be doubted. Of course from the Euro-
pean perspective the major concern is food safety re-
lated to products entering the EU. That concern for
foodsafety isparamount.10Foodsafety concernsmay
therefore often tramp with economic development
in nations in Africa or elsewhere.
The remainder of this article is structured as fol-
lows: the second section presents Benin and the
evolvement of shrimp trade patterns with regard to
the EU control system (II). The third section shows
the main principles of the food safety legal frame-
work at both sides (III). The fourth (IV) section pro-
vides some insights in the interactions between these
two sets of legislation and the fifth section address-
es the effectiveness of the EU approach (V). Section
VI concludes.
4 Dey et al. (2005) reported that following better implementation
and enforcement of HACCP procedures, Sri Lanka has been able
to increase fish exports to the EU by more than 600% in three
years. See Dey, M., M. Rab, K. Jahan, A. Nisapa, A. Kumar, and
M. Ahmed. Food Safety Standards and Regulatory Measures:
Implications for Selected Fish-Exporting Asian Countries. Aqua-
culture Economics and Management, 9(1-2), (2005),
pp. 217–236.
5 See among others Steven Jaffee, and Spencer Henson, Standards
and Agro-Food Exports from Developing Countries: Rebalancing
the Debate,World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3348
(2004) 1–44; Anh Van Thi Nguyen and Norbert L. W. Wilson,
Effects of Food Safety Standards on Seafood Exports to US, EU
and Japan, Paper presented at the Southern Agricultural Econom-
ics Association Annual Meeting, (2009); Anders, Sven and
Caswell, Julie A., Standards as Barriers Versus Standards as Cata-
lysts: Assessing the Impact of HACCP Implementation on U.S.
Seafood Imports. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
(2009) Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 310–321
6 Henson, S., Brouder, A.M. & Mitullah, W., Food safety require-
ments and food exports from developing countries: the case of
fish exports from Kenya to the European Union. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 82, (2000), pp. 1159–1169.
7 These bans also involved the other countries exporting Nile Perch
to the EU. Unlike Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya had more difficul-
ties to adjust to EU standards. Therefore it was downgraded and
went from being on list I (which enabled exports to all EU coun-
tries) to List II status (which only enabled to export by means of
bilateral agreements with specific EU countries)
8 Luz B. Diaz Rios and Steven Jaffee, supra note 2.
9 This fundamental principle is laid down by the article 11 of the
regulation 178/2002 that stipulates: “Food and feed imported
into the Community for placing on the market within the Com-
munity shall comply with the relevant requirements of food law
or conditions recognised by the Community to be at least equiva-
lent thereto or, where a specific agreement exists between the
Community and the exporting country, with requirements con-
tained therein.
10 See also Stefano Ponte, Bans, Tests, and Alchemy: Food Safety
Regulation and the Uganda Fish Export Industry, Agriculture and






















































































































EJRR 2|2014 189Shrimp Export from Benin vs Food Safety in Europe: Reconcilable Interests?
II. The evolution of Benin and the EU’s
fisheries trade
1. What is Benin?
Benin is a small Least Developed Country11 situated
in West Africa, and characterized by an extrovert
economy, dominated by subsistence agriculture.
Benin is not exactly a country endowed with enor-
mous fishing potential. It benefits from an opening
on the sea which grants the country a sandy facade
extending on 120 kilometres from the Nigerian bor-
der in the East to the Togolese border in theWest and
an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of about 27,750
km². The water coverage in Benin is insignificant
compared to other countries in similar climatic
zones12. The great majority of halieutic resources are
to be found in the southern regions from the lake
Ahémé (8.500 ha), the lake Nokoué (15.000 ha) and
to a lesser extent the lagoon of Porto-Novo (3000 ha).
Internal waters provide 4/5 of the national produc-
tion, and crustaceans represent about 15% of the
main species caught in the southern waters13. Fish-
ing is considered as an important binding factor for
riparian populations14 and, economically, it gener-
ates employment, taxes andexport revenues earning.
Yet, fishery products represent only 1% of the over-
all GDP. Generally speaking, fishery products corre-
spond to 50% of animal proteins consumed15. Na-
tional production covers only 31.9% of needs in ani-
mal protein and Benin resorts to import to cover the
deficit.
Fishing is carried out artisanally, using rudimen-
tarymeans, mostly wooden canoes propelled by pad-
dles. Shrimp fishery is a seasonal activity that lasts
about eight months annually; it occupies only 21,000
fishermen including 8,000 engaging in the activity
on a seasonal basis16. Led by three companies (CRUS-
TAMER, FSG, SOBEP), and exclusively oriented to-
wards the EU, the industrial shrimp sector was en-
gaged in the export of frozen shrimps that were ei-
ther whole or prepared by a process of topping, heat-
ing, or peeling. Data on shrimp exports go back to
1994, because the first export-oriented processing
company (SOBEP) was created the previous year. Ta-
ble 1 provides an overview of the three companies.
Together, these three companies employ around
1200 seasonal employeesduring the shrimpseason17.
Since January2010, onlyCRUSTAMERandFSGhave
been authorised by the EU to export fishery products
to its territory, as well as a company created in 2003
(Société DIAX), which, nevertheless exports very lit-
tle quantity of shrimps.
The three companies exported an average of 350
tons from 1994 to 1997. The export which dropped
to 250 tons in 1997, increased to 453 tons in 1998,
11 United Nations, The Least Developed Countries Report 2008,
Growth, Poverty and the Terms of Development Partnership
2008, (2011) at p 5.
12 Carolina Domínguez-Torres and Vivien Foster, Benin's Infrastruc-
ture: A Continental Perspective.World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper Series No. 5689, (2011) at p20 available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1871585, visited on 17/08/2011.
13 Bonaventure Houndekon, Conservation et commercialisation des
produits de pêche lagunaire, FAO, Proceedings of the symposium
on post-harvest fish technology, (1992).
14 FAO/Fishery and aquaculture country profiles, (2008) Vue
générale du secteur des pêches national, République du Bénin,
p4. This is due to its contribution to limit rural depopulation, the
dropping of traditional activities and the reduction of demograph-
ic and water draining problems noticeable in Cotonou, the eco-
nomic capital.
15 Commission Européenne, Bénin, Profil Environnemental du
Bénin, Rapport Final Provisoire, 2006.
16 République du Bénin/Délégation de la Commission Européenne
au Bénin, Diagnostic de la filière crevette, 2009.
17 République du Bénin, Plan de Relance de la Filière Halieutique,
Projet Appui au Secteur Privé, 2007.
Overview of Benin’s shrimp processing plants
Source: Plan de Relance de la Filière Halieutique/ Diagnostic de la Filière Crevette
Designation CRUSTAMER FSG SOBEP
Legal Form LLC LLC LC
Date of Creation 1997 1994 1993
Capital (MXOF) 170 100 110
Turnover 2002 (MXOF) 1319 1066 792
Turnover 2002 (M€) 2.00 1.62 1.20
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and from then on, an upward trend was observed,
reaching over 700 tons in 2002, which was rightly
considered the best year of the shrimp export histo-
ry of Benin. At this stage, an important event led to
a radical change of the shrimp export story.
2. Inspection missions in Benin and their
impact on trade relations
a. First mission: Diagnostic of the system of
shrimp production
After the BSE crisis and the redefinition of the food
safety policy it required, the European Commission
initiated its Communication “Commission's Green
Paper on food law”18 that propelled the creation in
1997 of the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO). This
latter became the organ par excellence of the imple-
mentation of EU control policies that should lead to
the official certification of third countries exporting
fishery products to the EU. In the early days, given
the number of Member States to inspect, the multi-
plicity of third countries, and the small number of
the workforce of the FVO, controls were sometimes
limited to a mere documentary assessment19. But in-
creasingly, on-site visits were conducted by agents of
the FVO to assess the actual conditions under which
stakeholders involved in the production process op-
erate. Later on, priority was given to third countries
with past records of health issues20 and to those with
a large volume of trade with the EU. Inspections can
also answer the request for approval addressed to the
EU by a third country or in response to disease out-
breaks. Generally, inspection results can be used to
refuse, withdraw or modify authorizations for ex-
ports to the EU21.
Produced as part of the schedule of missions of
the FVO, the inspection of 2002 was the first of its
kind in the area of fishery products in Benin22. It fol-
lowed the inscription of Benin for the import of fish-
ery products on June 30, 1998 on the part II of the
list annexed to the Decision 97/296/EC23, after a doc-
umentary assessment of the application for approval
was sent to the European Commission. The mission
was meant for the evaluation of the "equivalence of
the legislation of Benin with corresponding Commu-
nity requirements and performance of national au-
thorities for the control of conditions of production
and export of fishery products to the EU24”. The in-
spectors of the FVO visited the Competent Authori-
ty (CA), the National Health Laboratory, landing fa-
cilities, fishing ports and all three shrimp processing
establishments. The shortcomings identified related
to two major aspects: first, they singled out the con-
ditions of production themselves, including hygiene
and lack of knowledge of good production practices.
Second, they referred to the absence or obsolescence
of legal measures25 that should serve as a basis for
control operations to ensure that end products are
safe to eat. The corollary of this lack of legal basis
was the absence or inadequacy of control procedures
18 Commission’s green paper on food law, COM(97) 176 final.
19 Documentary assessment refers to a desk analysis of information
provided by third countries on their legal and institutional frame-
work as regards the conditions of production and control of the
safety of fishery products, and a report on the overall health
status in the country. For instance, in 1998, documentary assess-
ments led to the temporary authorizations of 37 countries, while
the 35 others were asked to provide more information and guaran-
tees due to the insufficiency of the first guarantees they provided.
20 Referring to the fact that the FVO would focus on third countries
where in the past food exports had shown health problems.
21 FVO missions were classified into two categories: the first mis-
sions to audit the Competent Authorities (CAs) are called “evalua-
tion missions”, while “inspections” are carried out for the follow-
up to the evaluations. When the results of a follow-up inspection
reveal that satisfactory measures had been undertaken, the report
is closed. Otherwise, the case is referred to the Commission
Services to consider the most appropriate course of action to be
taken. (See European Commission, Health and Consumer Protec-
tion Directorate-General, Food and Veterinary Office, FVO
annual report 2001). The FVO checks compliance with EU food
safety and quality requirements at both processing plants and
CAs. To ensure transparency, results of the inspection missions
are made available promptly to enable the checked country to
respond to the observations made, and, if necessary, take neces-
sary measures in due course. Missions in third countries enable in
the early days the adoption of policies to monitor production
standards for fishery products, and decide emergency restrictions
when essential improvements were needed (See European Com-
mission, Directorate-General XXIV Consumer Policy and Health
Protection- Food and Veterinary Office, Food and Veterinary
Office Annual Report April 1998- March 1999).
22 The 2002 mission was conducted on the basis of three main EU
texts that were then in force, namely Directives 91/493/EEC and
92/48/EEC and Decision 98/140/EC. The current regulatory frame-
work in the EU will be discussed in more detail below III-1.
23 Commission Decision 97/296/EC drawing up the list of third
countries from which the import of fishery products is authorized
for human consumption, OJ 1997 L 122.
24 Commission Européenne, Rapport concernant une mission en
République du Bénin du 7 au 11 Octobre 2002 concernant les
conditions de production et d’exportation vers l’Union Eu-
ropéenne des produits de la pêche, DG(SANCO)/8719/2002 –
MR Final, (2003) at p4.
25 The six texts then presented were still in draft form and contained
gaps in the definition of essential parameters such as maximum
limits for contaminants in the natural environment, histamine and
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with regard to the organization of landing activities,
the collection of freshly caught shrimps, the uneven
implementation of production principles, and the
use of questionablemethods by operators such as hy-
perchlorination. As a result, the inspection team con-
cluded that the CA for fishery products in Benin had
no legal basis to set up a monitoring system to en-
sure and certify the export of products in conformi-
ty with EU requirements26. Therefore, Benin was
foundnot to be able to guarantee and certify the com-
pliance of products exported to the EU as regards the
requirements of Directive 91/493/EEC27 concerning
the production and placing on the market of fishery
products.
These observations of the FVO undoubtedly had
a factual basis and the critical comments concerning
the system of food safety control in Benin can hence
as such be understood.
The shortcomings identified during the mission
have led to recommendations to take corrective ac-
tions. As a matter of fact, Beninese authorities were
invited to provide the FVO with a written undertak-
ing in the formofguarantees, togetherwith adetailed
timetable. The remedial measures proposed were to
be assessed by the Commission services and, in case
of positive assessment, would give rise to a new FVO
visit. In reaction, Benin submitted both an action
plan and an application for funding to the European
Commission within the framework of a project enti-
tled "Improving the health of fishery products in
Benin”, which resumes some of the corrective mea-
sures of the action plan.
Notwithstanding this action plan, the FVO inspec-
tors suggested to the Commission to "consider the
need to take protective measures proportional to the
deficiencies identified ". Guarantee measures imme-
diately suggested by the authorities in Benin were
considered insufficient by the FVO to overcome the
weaknesses identified. As a result, a few months af-
ter the visit, in August 2003, Benin decided unilater-
ally to temporarily suspend all shrimp exports to the
EU in order to improve the conditions of production
and control of shrimp in the country. This measure
was maintained for eighteen months. In February
2005, the voluntary export ban decided in Benin was
lifted by the EU, which gave its official approval to
receive again fishery products from Benin through
regulation 2076/2005/EC28. However, before this ban
was lifted, processing companies were urged to de-
stroy all stocks still in their possession. 189 tons of
shrimps, valued at 700millionCFA francs,more than
one million €, were destroyed in early 200529. Given
the consequences of the suspension and the destruc-
tion of stocks, companies have not been able to ben-
efit from the end of the suspension. Exports never
really revived: two companies resumed their activi-
ty, and were later on obliged to stop due to financial
constraints. As a result, 175 tons of shrimp were still
exported in 2005, but exports fell to 32 tons in 2006.
The following years had not been more successful
with respectively 54.6 and 6.2 tons exported in 2007
and 2008. But yet, alerts were raised about Benin’s
shrimps within the framework of the Rapid Alert
System for Food and Feed (RASFF) of the EU. These
notifications, three in 2005 and one in 2006, were all
about excessive rates of sulphite in frozen whole raw
shrimps. This could be explained by the tightening
of controls following the recommendation of the
FVO’s inspectors to test the products from Benin
against sulphite residues.
It is important to note that neither the FVO nor
the EU Commission ever formally prohibited import
of shrimps from Benin. In any case, the results of the
FVOwere such that theBenin authorities understood
that shrimp exports were, after the first FVO inspec-
tion, pointless, and individual consignments could
still be blocked at the EU border with catastrophic fi-
nancial consequences for Benin exporters. Beninese
authorities then felt it wiser to anticipate potential
EUmeasures against the country. According to them,
a EUbanwould have beenmuchworse andmore dif-
ficult to overcome: “To do nothing was risky. The
damage of a European ban would have lasted much
longer30.” That is why Benin decided unilaterally to
26 Commission Européenne, supra note 24, at p 6.
27 Council Directive 91/493/EEC laying down the health conditions
for the production and placing on the market of fishery products,
OJ 1991 L268.
28 Benin was listed on the list II of the annex to Regulation
2076/2005/EC (Commission Regulation laying down transitional
arrangements for the implementation of Regulations (EC) No
853/2004, (EC) No 854/2004 and (EC) No 882/2004 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council and amending Regulations
(EC) No 853/2004 and (EC) No 854/2004, OJ 2005 L338/83),
amended by Commission Regulation 1666/2006 of 6 November
2006. This regulation gave approval to Benin to export to the EU
through bilateral agreements.
29 This new self-imposed measure was implicitly taken by the
government of Benin, which was supposed to give a financial
compensation to the companies accordingly.
30 Joseph Ouaké, Officer of the Industry and Commerce Ministry in
Benin, in Trading Safely: protecting health, promoting develop-
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suspend shrimp export to the EU and to work joint-
lywith the EUon an improvement of food safety con-
ditions, hoping on a more positive attitude of Euro-
pean authorities. It is in the framework of these “ne-
gotiations”31 that the EU could also require the de-
struction of existing stocks in Benin in early 2005,
even though this measure had no formal legal basis.
b. Second mission: Assessment of the
implementation of upgrading measures
The second mission in 2009 aimed also to assess
whether official controls by the CA can ensure that
the conditions of production of fishery products in
Benin intended for export to the EU are equivalent
to the requirements of the Community32. Through
this goal, this mission gave recognition of the signif-
icant improvements in the sector since 2002. Indeed,
many changes occurred both in legislative and insti-
tutional terms. Beyond the adoption of several texts,
the CA was reorganized, training was given to stake-
holders, some laboratories are in the process to be ac-
credited, some infrastructures33 were built along one
lake to assess directly the quality of freshly caught
shrimps before they are released for processing. Be-
sides, works were in progress for the creation of a
Beninese Food Safety Authority that must play a key
role in the implementation of risk analysis.
Overall, the inspection team declared that the
Beninese legislation could be considered equivalent
to EU requirements although some texts have not yet
been published in the Official Journal. However, the
fact remains that deficiencies were also detected in
the new control system. They are mostly poor sani-
tation at landing sites while raw materials must nec-
essarily pass by them. In spite of the census done
with regard to fishermen, therewas no system to pre-
vent unregistered fishermen to also supply collectors
with products. Controls were not regularly and suf-
ficiently made in accordance with the schedule and
following the rules provided for this purpose in the
manual of inspection. In addition, the system put in
place did not allow the CA to certify all entries listed
in the health certificate. Consequently, the control
system was not considered equivalent to the relevant
part of EU legislation, in this respect the first chap-
ter of the Annex III of Regulation 854/2004.
Moreover, because the processing plants were
closed, the CA found it no longer necessary to carry
out the usual controls. Therefore, obvious deficien-
cies in the control systemof theseplantshadnotbeen
identified by the inspectors of the CA. Nevertheless,
due to their approval by the EU, FVO inspectors ex-
tended their control to those plants and reported de-
ficiencies in the implementation of HACCP plans,
lack of knowledge of the conditions of use of preser-
vatives or additives, and hygienic handling defect.
The team noted that procedures did not provide for
the suspension of approval for establishmentswhich
stopped their activities, violating the article 12 of EU
regulation 854/2004. Given all these shortcomings,
the implementation of the food legislation with re-
gard to the functioning of factories was still deemed
not to be equivalent to the relevant rules of EU law34.
In conclusion, the FVO inspectors had found that
one could not consider that "the organization of the
CA and the implementation of national provisions
on which is based the control of fishery products in-
tended for export to the EU were at least equivalent
to EU requirements." However, this did not prevent
the EU from formally recognizing Benin as a coun-
try that can export fishery products to the EU as from
January 201035. But today the industry is almost at
rest: one company closed down, the premises of the
second are seized by the tax administration, and the
third one is closed for renovation. In reality they are
overindebted and all lack the financial capacity to get
back into their activities36.
III. Regulatory frameworks
We will now briefly recall the development of EU
food standards, indicating that in the relationship to
31 Whereby de facto the EU dictates under which conditions it
would accept shrimp export from Benin again.
32 The mission of 2009 was carried out on the basis of the article 46
of regulation 882/2004 and the Decision 98/140/EC.
33 These are Obligatory Base of Control and Platform of Transfer.
34 Chapter III of Section VIII of Annex III of Regulation (EC)
No 853/2004 and Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 852/2004.
35 Commission Decision 2009/951/EU of 14 December 2009
amending Annexes I and II to Decision 2006/766/EC establishing
the lists of third countries and territories from which imports of
bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates, marine gastropods and
fishery products are permitted, OJ L328/70 of 15 December
2009.
36 For instance, an own interview revealed that one shrimp compa-
ny used to benefit from a prefunding from its main customer right
at the beginning of the shrimp season. This gave that company an
undeniable advantage because it had a good financial flexibility,
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third countries they de facto have an extraterritorial
effect (1); next, we will turn to food safety standards
in Benin showing that under pressure from the EU,
Benin de facto copy-pasted European food law into
its own legislation (2).
1. EU food safety standards
a. The development of the General Food Law
The current EU food regulatory regime is a compre-
hensive and integrated approach to food safety37. It
was established in 2002 by the regulation EC No
178/200238, commonly called the General Food Law
(GFL). In the EU context, ‘food law’ refers to the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions governing
food ingeneral, and foodsafety inparticular,whether
at Community or national level. In 2004, a set of reg-
ulations was adopted, commonly referred to as the
“food hygiene package39”. The current hygiene legis-
lation, which has been qualified as a “patchwork” of
different pieces of legislation40, comprises the Regu-
lations 852/200441, 853/200442, and 854/200443,
alongwithRegulation 882/200444 onofficial controls
addressed to CA’s.
The EU food legislation is based on a farm-to-fork
system and the implementation of requirements de-
rived from transparency and proportionality and,
wherever applicable, based on the principles of risk
analysis45 which comprise the precautionary princi-
ple46. The GFL establishes the primary responsibili-
ty of Food Business Operators (FBO’s) to ensure that
food to be placed on the market meets the require-
ments of food law, with the understanding that they
must implement the principles of HACCP47, includ-
ing the obligations of traceability of own checks
thereon. EU Member States and the EU Commission
share competence with regard to the enforcement of
the food legislation.
37 The GFL does not explicitly define food safety, but, on the con-
trary, it states the conditions of an unsafe food: “Food shall be
deemed to be unsafe if it is considered to be injurious to health or
unfit for human consumption”, taking into account normal condi-
tions of use.
38 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 laying down the general principles
and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food
safety; OJ 2002 L31.
39 Food hygiene refers to “the measures and conditions necessary to
control hazards and to ensure fitness for human consumption of a
foodstuff taking into account its intended use”. (Regulation
852/2004, article 2.a).
40 Raymond O’Rourke, European food law, Palladian Law Pub.,
(1998).
41 Regulation 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs, OJ 2004 L139.
It sets basic rules and principles applicable to food business
operators throughout the food chain.
42 Regulation 853/2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food
of animal origin, OJ 2004 L 226. It defines specific hygiene rules
to be applied to food of animal origin.
43 Regulation 854/2004 laying down specific rules for the organiza-
tion of official controls on products of animal origin intended for
human consumption, OJ 2004 L 226. It sets the rules to be ap-
plied by national authorities for the control and enforcement of
food hygiene policies.
44 Regulation 882/2004 on official controls performed to ensure the
verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health
and animal welfare rules, OJ 2004 L 191.
45 Risk analysis is a process consisting of three separate but integrat-
ed components namely risk assessment, risk management and
risk communication. Risk assessment is a process by which
scientists evaluate the potential for adverse health or environmen-
tal effects from exposure to naturally occurring or synthetic agent
(See Risk Assessment: What’s it all about?Society of toxicology’s
newsletter, Communiqué, Special Issue, p. 9 (1998) at p1. Ac-
cording to article 3.12 of the GFL, risk management means the
process, distinct from risk assessment, of weighing policy alterna-
tives in consultation with interested parties, considering risk
assessment and other legitimate factors, and, if need be, selecting
appropriate prevention and control options. Risk communication
is defined by article 3.13 of the GFL as the interactive exchange
of information and opinions throughout the risk analysis process
as regards hazards and risks, risk-related factors and risk percep-
tions, among risk assessors, risk managers, consumers, feed and
food businesses, the academic community and other interested
parties, including the explanation of risk assessment findings and
the basis of risk management decisions.
46 As a part of risk management, the precautionary principle enables
the adoption of provisional measures in specific circumstances
where, following an assessment of available information, the
possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific
uncertainty persists. Regulation 178/2002, supra note 40, Arti-
cle 7. The importance of risk analysis in handling food risks has
previously been recognized through the communication from the
Commission on the precautionary principle (See Commission of
the European Communities, Communication from the Commis-
sion on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1, 2000). This
paper has outlined the various components of risk analysis, while
emphasizing the need to apply the precautionary principle in
cases of scientific uncertainty. The application of the precaution-
ary principle which is mentioned in the Treaty only in relation to
the environment, must be extended to risks related to human,
animal and plant health, taking into account the costs and bene-
fits of action or lack of action.
47 HACCP is as systematic and science based approach that enables
the detection of potential food safety hazards in order to take
preventive measures accordingly. The adoption of a HACCP
procedure consists in identifying along the process of preparation,
processing and distribution the stages essential for food safety.
Called Critical Control Points (CCPs), those stages are the basis for
the detection of potential hazards in foodstuffs, and represent the
way forward to the setting down of the most adequate system for
their prevention, elimination or reduction to acceptable levels.
Overall, the HACCP consists of seven distinct principles: a-
Conduct of a hazard analysis; b- Identification of CCPs; c- Estab-
lishment of critical limits at CCPs; d- Establishment and imple-
mentation of effective monitoring procedures at CCPs; e- Estab-
lishment of corrective actions; f- Establishment of verification
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b. Extraterritoriality
As regards third countries, “Food and feed imported
into the Community for placing on the market with-
in the Community shall comply with the relevant re-
quirements of food law or conditions recognised by
the Community to be at least equivalent thereto or,
where a specific agreement exists between the Com-
munity and the exporting country, with require-
ments contained therein”48. The EU Commission
must delegate experts to performon-spot inspections
to assess the conformity or equivalence of their leg-
islation with Community’s requirements. These in-
spections constitute the basis of numerous decisions
concerning imports within the EU. The irregularities
detected could lead either to the simple imposition
of sanitation procedures, or to the suspension or
withdrawal of the establishment’s approval. In the
case of consignments from third countries, such ac-
tions could result in the seizure of consignments fol-
lowed by the destruction or the re-dispatch of prod-
ucts outside the Community.
For products of animal origin, the most important
import standard is the requirement of a formal ap-
proval of the third country or a part of it. In that re-
spect a list of authorized countries is drawn up and
updated by the Community, according to a wide
range of criteria generally comprising the ability of
the legislation to comply with general and specific
European requirements, the financial and material
capacity of CA’s to implement, enforce and properly
control rules set up by that legislation49. Moreover
the same prerequisite is compulsory for establish-
ments in third countrieswhich intend to export prod-
ucts of animal origin to the EU.However, in this case,
the ability of the CA to provide sufficient guarantees
is a precondition which decides whether the estab-
lishment could even benefit from the opportunity of
a conformity assessment procedure50. Such a respon-
sibility underlies the legal power of the CA to stop
exports to the EU when an establishment is found
failing to comply with essential requirements.
Official controls on the production and placing on
the market of fishery products are to include, in par-
ticular, regular checks on the hygiene conditions of
landing and first sale, inspections at regular inter-
vals of vessels and establishments on land, includ-
ing fish auctions and wholesale markets and checks
on storage and transport conditions51. The detection
inexcess of contaminants and residues, thenon-com-
pliance with relevant legislation on organoleptic,
chemical, physical or microbiological elements, the
presence of poisons are all sufficient grounds to de-
clare a fishery product unfit for human consump-
tion.
2. Benin’s food safety standards
a. The first attempts at regulation
The 2002 FVO mission and the recommendations
contained in the report were the catalyst for a series
of reforms at various levels in response to what
amounted to a legislative lethargy in Benin in the
field of food. An immediate reactionwas given in the
form of commitments made by Benin through its ac-
tion plan. The decree 11452 on the quality assurance53
of fishery products has been adopted in April 2003,
even before the government decision to suspend
shrimp exports, to implement the law 84-009 on con-
trol of foodstuffs. The decree 114 defines the regime
of the health rules for fishery products, their condi-
tions of processing, preservation, and marketing, as
well as the tax system related to these products. This
decree paved the way for the adoption of a set of sev-
en other orders in the same year that deal with ques-
tions related to establishments, hygiene, good labo-
ratory practices and to limits of certain substances
in fishery products.
48 Regulation 178/2002, Article 10.
49 Regulation 854/2004, Article 11(4).
50 Due to their particular activity, some establishments do not need
a prior authorization to export towards the EU. There are mainly
establishments carrying out only primary production, transport
operations, storage of products of animal origin, not requiring
temperature-controlled storage conditions. Besides, some prod-
ucts of animal origin were not assigned any specific hygiene
requirements by the regulation 853/2004 laying down specific
hygiene rules for food of animal origin. In the same way, the
latter are not required to appear on a list of authorized establish-
ments.
51 Regulation 854/2004, Annex III.
52 Decree No. 114, laying down the quality assurance of fishery
products in the Republic of Benin, OJ 2003 No. 20.
53 Quality assurance is defined as all the concerted and systematic
measures necessary to obtain reasonable assurance that a product
or service meets given requirements of quality. As such, quality
assurance constitutes a strategic function that works together with
the quality control to achieve its goal. In this regard, quality
control should be understood as a technical function that in-
cludes all the technical and operational activities implemented to
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b. Second series of regulation: Copy-pasting EU
food law
In 2009, within the space of two months, five new
texts were adopted with regard to food safety in
Benin. Rather than merely focusing on fishery prod-
ucts as the previous texts did, these new texts are ded-
icated to the regulationof foodstuffs in general.Quite
surprisingly, they correspond literally with the texts
in force within the EU. This implies in particular that
they entirely subscribe to all the principles and mea-
sures described above with regard to EU food law. As
we will indicate below, this led to the occurrence of
rather meaningless references to European law that
can now be found in Benin food law.
Such an approach has the merit of strengthening
Benin’s legislation and making it more compliant
with the holistic approach in fashion internationally.
However, it is clear that as much as the first steps
were hard to be appliedproperly for lack of resources,
be it human, material or financial, the new measures
would even have a harder time finding away through
the administrative and legal structures in Benin. Ob-
viously, it is quite pointless to adopt a legal frame-
work that would appear to be totally unimplement-
ed and unenforceable. Scholarship acknowledges
that regulatory efforts indeveloping countries should
aim at designing regulation which is appropriate to
the legal, economic, political, and social situations in
which they must function54. The literal transposition
of EU food law into Benin law seems to continue the
old habit of some African countries of importing the
laws of the former colonizers. While legal borrowing
and legal transplants are certainly not new concepts,
for such a transplanted law to be effective, it must be
meaningful in the domestic context so as to provide
an incentive to citizens to use it, and demand institu-
tions that work to enforce and develop the law55. In
effect, legality56 is a function of the demand for law,
and only a high demand can impulse high voluntary
compliance, leading a society to invest in legal insti-
tutions necessary for upholding the legal order57.
In this particular case, there was no such demand
for a food safety law, or at least there was no strong
demand of regulation for the domestic market itself.
All legal provisions adopted in this domain in Benin
since 2003 only satisfy the compelling need to meet
EU requirements in fear of being excluded from the
shrimp export trade. This also explains why, in most
cases during the upgrading process, the Benin gov-
ernment was quite slow in making available the
funds necessary to implement the law, and in some
instances failed to do so58.
c. Other West African countries
The observation of other cases in the West African
Region shows various results. While some countries
like Senegal and Ivory Coast tend to have a better re-
activity in front of non-compliances detected by the
FVO, others like Benin and Togo are slower in under-
taking reforms. These two groups of countries share
between themselves some common features. With
regard to traded volume, Senegal and Ivory Coast ex-
ported respectively 43.000 and 25.000 tons of fishery
products in 201159. Before the ban, Benin, in its best
year in 2002, exported only about 700 tons, while
neighbouring Togo exported 1.500 tons in 200160.
54 Michael Faure, Morag Goodwin and Franziska Weber, Bucking
the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective Environmental Regulation
in Developing Countries, Virginia Journal of International Law,
Vol. 51 pp. 95–157 (2010), at p. 100.
55 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard,
The transplant effect, The American Journal of Comparative Law,
Vol. 51, No. 1 pp. 163-203, at p 167
56 Legality is determined by the ability of a country to give meaning
to the transplanted formal legal order and to apply it within the
context of its own socioeconomic conditions (See Daniel
Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, supra note
55 at p 167).
57 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard,
supra note 55, at p 189.
58 The government had indeed to incur expenses to support compa-
nies to compensate for their losses and had made ​​financial com-
mitments in relation to projects funded by the EU and by the
Belgian Technical Cooperation. For instance, the equipment of
laboratories within the framework of the Quality Program (funded
by the EU and implemented by UNIDO) has been stopped at
some point because Benin did not keep its promises with respect
to the estimates.
59 Ivory Coast also exported about 100.000 tons through directly
transshipped in the EU from freezer vessels flying the flag of
either a third country or a EU Member. See respectively Commis-
sion Européenne, Rapport d’Un Audit Effectué au Sénégal du 22
Janvier au 01 Février 2013 afin d’Evaluer les Systèmes de Contrôle
en Place Régissant la Production des Produits de la Pêche Des-
tinés à l’Exportation vers l’Union Européenne, DG(SANCO) 2013-
6708 - RM FINAL, 2013; Commission Européenne, Rapport d’Un
Audit Effectué en Côte d’Ivoire du 22 Janvier au 01 Février 2013
afin d’Evaluer les Systèmes de Contrôle en Place Régissant la
Production des Produits de la Pêche Destinés à l’Exportation vers
l’Union Européenne, DG(SANCO) 2013-6706 - RM FINAL, 2013
60 Another 1000 tons were transshipped in the EU. See Commission
Européenne, Rapport Final Concernant une Mission Réalisée au
Togo du 14 au 18 Octobre 2002 Concernant les Conditions de
Production et d’Exportation vers l’Union Européenne des Produits
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With regard to compliance, the systems in both Sene-
gal and Ivory Coast were found compliant to the one
of the EU already in 1997. Although compliance is-
sues were later reported by the FVO, both countries
managed to take necessary steps to upgrade to a sat-
isfactory level61. In contrast, thedeficiencies inBenin
and Togo were much harder to overcome. Both coun-
tries decided to suspend their shrimp exports to the
EU in 2003, and to apply for EU funding to under-
take regulatory and institutional reforms. Despite EU
assistance, the outcome of the upgrading process is
not very positive. While the shrimp export sector in
Benin has practically disappeared, Togo is facing an
official EU ban for fishery products except live lob-
sters. These examples point out that many factors
can influence anupgrading process.When the stakes
are high, the reactivity and the commitment of do-
mestic stakeholders tend also to be higher, resulting
in a better outcome. High-quality food safety stan-
dards then become catalysts, contributing to build-
ing capacity to ensure higher safety of the fishery
products for the export supply-chain, which might
later result inpositive spillovers on thedomesticmar-
ket. But standards will act as barriers for smaller in-
dustries, especially when they rely heavily on only
one outlet market. Besides, exclusive reliance on ex-
ternal aid to undertake reforms cast some doubts as
regards the viability and the sustainability of the im-
proved food safety system. Technical assistance in
Benin and Togo have led to better laws, but not to
more effective foodproduction and controls systems.
One should not lose sight that law is not an end in
itself, but is always ameans to other ends62. In Benin,
the aimwas to at least formally have the law required
by the EU and ironically in a way they succeeded in
that. This case is the perfect example that “legal re-
forms viewed simply as technical assistance pro-
grams that can be implemented by having Western
experts design good laws, are unlikely to produce the
desired outcome, i.e. an effective legal order and eco-
nomic growth and development63”.
IV. Interdependencies between Benin
and EU food laws
The implementation of food law is not without risks
or potential flaws, not even within the EU. The cur-
rent EU legislationwas the outcome of a long process
that enabled to capitalize on experiences and mis-
takes in order to realize over time the adjustments
necessitated by either structural constraints or scien-
tific contingencies. Even if the implementationof the
hygiene package did not create major difficulties for
FBOs and CAs in the EU, it is still slightly cumber-
some for some small establishments. The findings of
the relevant FVO missions show that some small
businesses were sometimes obliged to use external
consultancy, which was in some cases not relevant
for the reality of their establishment, resulting in
more documentation and records than mandatory.
Besides they were not efficient and overly expensive.
Someminor problemswere raised about the difficul-
ties to satisfy the record-keeping requirement, which
is seenas anadministrativeburden.At the same time,
the guides to good practicewere appreciated for their
valuable inputs for primary producers.64 Similarly,
the institutional support progressively improved to
cope with changes in the legal requirements adopt-
ed. The fact remains that while the rules were being
strengthened for EUMember Countries and their op-
erators, they were equally hardened for third coun-
tries, especially with the advent of the conformity or
equivalence requirement.Aswe just showed, this has
placed Benin in the skin of most developing coun-
tries that become “regulation takers”65 for the sake
of their commercial interests. In so doing, some of
themexpect to be able to reach from scratch the same
institutional and operational level as the EU. This has
proved to be very difficult for Benin, given that al-
ready for a decade it continues to struggle to imple-
ment the necessary framework. To name just a few
problematic issues: laboratories are still not accred-
ited, and the fishermenareonlypartially identified66.
61 However, it should be noted that the FVO reported in 2013 that
doubts remain about the reliability of the results of laboratory
analysis in Ivory Coast. Likewise, some shortcomings were point-
ed out in the control system and some recommendations from
earlier FVO reports were yet to be applied.
62 Alan Watson, The Evolution of Western Private Law, The John
Hopkins University Press, (2001) at p. 198.
63 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard,
supra note 57, at p. 190.
64 See European Commission/Directorate-General for Health and
Consumers, Report from the Commission to the Council and to
the European Parliament on the experience gained from the
Implementation of the Hygiene Regulations (EC) No 852/2004,
(EC) No 853/2004 and (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 29 April 2004, European Communi-
ties 2009.
65 Stefano Ponte, supra note 10.
66 This was an important step to properly ensure the obligation of
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Yet, despite this validation and institutional
changes that ensued after the advent of the GFL and
thehygienepackage, Benin still felt obliged to change
its standards once again, this time by simply copy-
ing the texts in force within the EU. This is all the
more disturbing since the texts are sometimes mis-
understood by Benin’s authorities. Some errors clear-
ly suggest that the initiators of the draft texts have
not necessarily understood themeaning and spirit of
the texts of EU food law. For example, one might
point out articles where references are wrongly
made. This is the case for articles 50 and 51 of Order
075 of Benin which provides measures of crisis man-
agement to supplement the measures set by article
47, if this latter proves inadequate to ensure efficient
management of food risks. While in the EU GFL, this
reference relates to emergency measures for import-
edproducts, thecorrelation is establishedunderBeni-
nese lawwith regard to professional secrecy67. Those
contradictions are likely to compromise the imple-
mentation of the laws.
Similarly, one could point out the non-coordinat-
ed efforts to comply at all costs with EU law. For ex-
ample, certain concepts such as risk analysis that
were never mentioned in Benin law and are largely
unknown inBeninwere suddenly introduced andde-
fined in certain orders, while they did not have the
slightest interest for the orders in question, and none
of the articles refers to them. One could also mention
the definition of drinkingwater under Beninese food
law as "water at the point of compliance defined in
Article 6 of Directive 98/83/EC andwithout prejudice
to the requirements of Directives 80/778/EEC and
98/83/EC”,while Benin has its own standard of drink-
ing water since 200168. To make it worse, there was
not even given a slight hint concerning the defini-
tion of drinking water as provided by that EU direc-
tive.
V. Effectiveness of the EU approach
Despite the serious shortcomings revealed by the
FVO inspection inBenin in 2002, and the subsequent
recommendation to take protectivemeasures against
Benin, the EU did not officially take any action.
Therefore Benin remained on the list of countries
that were authorized to export to the EU. This im-
plies that, with regard to EU law, Benin was still con-
sidered a potentially 'safe source' for fishery prod-
ucts. The next EU step constituted in 'lifting' the ban
on shrimp exports in Benin by confirming its safe
source status through Regulation 2076/2005/EC, al-
lowing Benin to export to the EU through bilateral
agreements. The legitimacy of this step can be ques-
tioned because it did not follow a new inspection in
Benin as previously planned, to check the actual im-
provement that had occurred. Given the serious
shortcomings still revealed in 2009, one could as-
sume that the food safety law and system in Benin
in 2005 would not be any different. The adoption by
Benin of a new legislation was no guarantee of a bet-
ter enforcement that would lead to safer products. In
this regard, giving approval on the basis of written
guarantees provided by Benin is again a return to the
documentary assessment approval system with its
inherent flaws.
In another step, the EU granted list I status to
Benin after the FVO inspection of 2009, simply on
the basis of the equivalence established between
Benin and EU laws, even though the inspection also
revealed significant shortcomings in the entire im-
plementation system. This second approval not on-
ly confirmed Benin as a safe source for fishery prod-
ucts, but also 'promoted' it for its efforts to comply
with EU law. This process does not take into consid-
eration two essential aspects. First, the past records
of weak enforcement plaguing Benin's history com-
bined with the poor performance resulting from
nearly a decade of reforms reasonably suggest that
food safety is still and might continue to be an issue
in Benin in the short-term. Secondly, Benin’s govern-
ment had not shown a real commitment in the up-
grading process. All major reforms and needed ex-
pertise were subject to donors’ assistance, while
Benin neglected its share. This dependence on exter-
67 Article 50 provides that a general plan be established to clarify
the practical modalities for managing a crisis whose risks cannot
be effectively prevented, eliminated or reduced to an acceptable
level by the provisions of Article 47. Similarly, Article 51 refers to
the same Article 47, and requires the Competent Authority to
inform Beninese authorities whenever measures of Article 47 are
not sufficient for an efficient management of risks involved.
However, contrary to expectations, the Article 47 invoked in both
cases does not provide any measure of food risk management. It
states: "The protection of professional secrecy shall not prevent
the dissemination to the competent authorities of information
relevant to the functioning of market surveillance and enforce-
ment in the field of food and feed. The authorities receiving
information covered by professional secrecy shall ensure its
protection in accordance with Article 46.”
68 Decree No. 2001-094 of 20 February 2001 laying down quality
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nal aid to reach the food safety objectives set by a ‘too
high-quality’ legislation is also an indication that the
food safety level might stagnate or even regress in
the near future. This is already evidenced by many
unfinished works such as the platforms of transfer
or the equipment of laboratories. The lack of proper-
ly functioning laboratories in Benin entails a lack of
accreditation, which in turn implies that the EU can-
not – or should not? – fully trust test results and cer-
tification from Benin.
From a legal perspective, demanding conformity
requires harmonization of third countries legislation
with the one of the EU. Since it is well acknowledged
that EU law ismore stringent than international stan-
dards, harmonization in this context will then imply
a departure from what is required in WTO law. In-
deed, both the SPS and the TBT Agreements encour-
age harmonization as a trade facilitation tools, to the
extent that the required harmonization is based on
international standards69. Equivalence enables regu-
latory diversity by encouraging countries to accept
their differing regulations as equivalent, provided
that the exporting country’s measures can satisfy the
level of protection set by the importing Member.
Therefore the EU requirement for conformity or
equivalence leavesmuch regulatory space for export-
ing countries to choose the best alternative for them
in their search for gaining access to the EU market.
This approach goes even a step further by establish-
ing a one-way equivalence assessmentwhich relieves
the exporting Member from the burden of establish-
ing itself the equivalence with EU law.
In this way, the choice of Benin to harmonize its
law with EU law is a sovereign decision. However,
upgrading regulations reactively always limits the
regulatory autonomy of the Member concerned, par-
ticularlywhen there is a threat of an import ban from
the importing country in the case of non-compliance.
After Benin committed through the action plan, it es-
tablished with the EU a sort of contract whose viola-
tion could lead to a EU protective measure. There-
fore, it became urgent for Benin to actually under-
take regulatory reforms that led to the copy-pasting
of EU law. This obvious violation of the legitimate
legislative process can be explained for a large part
by the exclusive dependence on the EU market,
whichplaces onBenin an immediate pressure to seek
ways to comply. But considering the limited nation-
al capacities and financial resources, this reactive ap-
proach combinedwith the threat of an imminent ban
leave little room for coordinated self-conceived
strategies that would reveal more appropriate to do-
mestic needs. However, such a focus on national
needs has a variety of challenges. First, it might be
quite time-consuming and lead, at least temporarily,
to themuch-feared EUban. Besides, this strategywas
not attractive due to the extreme reliance on donors’
assistance to undertake the necessary reforms. Last-
ly, referring to article 4.2 of theWTOSPSAgreement,
Benin would bear the burden of objectively demon-
strating that its law can reach the same level of pro-
tection as attained by EU law. Copy-pasting EU law
appears to be the best way to circumvent this chal-
lenging requirement that calls for sufficient exper-
tise.
In fact, this situation creates two domestic supply-
chains for shrimps. On the one hand, a supply-chain
for the domestic market to which still applies the ‘old
non-compliant’ systemwithall related shortcomings.
On the other hand, there is a second supply-chain
that follows the rule of the borrowed legislation and
tries to comply with EU law. Whether this second
supply-chain leads to safer shrimps is still question-
able. In reality the same small-scale actors (fisher-
men, fishmongers) supply fresh shrimps to the do-
mestic market and the processing plants for exports
to the EU. According to a survey, the awareness of
the fishing community of the compliance issue is still
relatively low70. This fact alone can undermine the
whole process because the quality of the finished
product is closely linked to the quality of the raw ma-
terial. Besides, after the first upgradingmeasures and
the authorization to resume export that ensued in
February 2005, Benin was mentioned four times in
the RASFF. These notifications are evidence that de-
spite the improvement in the regulatory framework,
some more steps as regards implementation were
still necessary to reach an actually improved quality
of the shrimps. Butmost importantly, the FVO report
in 2009 showed that the production and control sys-
tem was still not reliable. Therefore, the CA in Benin
cannot provide assurance that the inspection of the
shrimps was performed in an equivalent way to that
of the EU. Seen in this light, if the shrimp export sec-
tor was still functional, the EU’s approval allows a
69 Article 3.1 of SPS Agreement, and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
70 Romain Houssa and Marijke Verpoorten, The Unintended Conse-
quence of an Export Ban: Evidence from Benin’s Shrimp Sector,
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loophole in its own system that could result in po-
tentially harmful products on its market. Therefore,
the legitimacy of the EU approach in ensuring prop-
er controls over the food safety system of third coun-
tries is undermined by the inconsistencies between
the results reportedand theactions takenby theCom-
mission.This kindofprocesshasbeen labelledwhite-
coat machinery to reassure insecure European regu-
lators and consumers71. Genuine health concerns
should not be compromised in front of evidence of
the unreliability of a food safety system of a given
third country. Thus, equivalence must not be grant-
ed on dubious grounds, because it might take away
the very benefits of the establishment of equivalence
such as the elimination of duplicative testing proce-
dures.
VI. Conclusion
The inconsistencybetween theprovisions of the laws
and their implementing decrees has been blamed as
the main weakness of the food safety law in Benin72.
Stakeholders often blamed this inconsistency as a
reason for theweak implementation of the law.How-
ever, inconsistencies in regulation are probably not
the only reason for failing food safety law. Despite
the efforts made at both the legislative and institu-
tional levels to improve the legislative and institu-
tional framework, the lack of appropriate capacity in
terms of inspections, monitoring and analysis, and
the fragmentation of stakeholders’ responsibilities
are still amajor impediment to the proper implemen-
tation of the law in practice. To some extent paradox-
ically the chaotic situation both in formal regulation
and in practice is partially the result of desperate ef-
forts of Benin to comply with relevant provisions of
EU law. First, the legislative process that started in
2003 aimed to somehow reproduce the provisions of
EU Directive 91/493. In a second step, the focus was
on the virtually blind transposition of the current EU
food legislation into Benin law. It should be noted
that the reforms undertaken were intended exclu-
sively for the export-oriented industry so as to secure
their market share. As a result, even the implemen-
tation efforts are only oriented towards that sector.
However, the shrimpexport sector inBeninhas large-
ly disappeared. Therefore, it appears that there is no
internal demand that could induce additional efforts
of implementation. The lethargy is likely to persist,
as society seems to have a remarkably high tolerance
for unsuitable law73.
The fact remains that in spite of the persistent in-
consistencies with regard to the institutional frame-
work and the conditions of production, the EU has
given its approval to Benin on the basis of the “com-
pliant” legislation and the guarantees to further pur-
sue the capacity building process. This shows some
more generalweaknesses concerning the control and
approval procedures in force within the EU. An ex-
cessive focus on the equivalence of the legislation
seems to pay little regard to actual compliance with
respect to implementation and enforcement. This
formal control seems to be just a way of showing the
willingness to give EU consumers the feelings that
the situation is under control, while some potential-
ly harmful products may still find their way to the
EU market74. This can be evidenced by the numer-
ous notifications through the RASFF. Not only can
this policybe inefficient inprotectingEUconsumers,
it may also be problematic from a development per-
spective.
In spite of EU assistance via its trade capacity
building programs, the shrimp export industry in
Benin has simply been wiped out. Moreover Benin
is not able to effectively implement its “compliant”
food law, because of recurrent financial and techni-
cal problems. In this respect, the demands of the EU
were mostly a triggering factor to the collapse of the
shrimpexport industry inBenin. Thepressure result-
ing from EU requirements would have been less dis-
71 Stefano Ponte, supra note 10. This white-coat machinery consists
in “fixing the system of regulations and inspection and by per-
forming the ritual of laboratory testing for all exports consign-
ments”. The phrasing had been specifically used to qualify a
similar situation of alternative bans and lifts of bans that occurred
in Uganda in the end of the nineties. More generally, the EU
import bans had then affected the countries that export to the EU
Nile Perch captured in lake Victoria. Various reasons motivated
those bans such as cholera outbreak in the region, alleged poi-
soning of the lake from the use of pesticides as means of capture,
deficiencies in the regulatory and control systems.
72 Mohamed Amaskane, Appui aux Systèmes d’Information sur les
Mesures Sanitaires et Phytosanitaires au Benin, Rapport de Mis-
sion MTF/BEN/053/STF, at p16, 2010.
73 Not only in Benin, but also more generally see: Edward M. Wise,
The transplant of legal patterns, The American Journal of Compar-
ative Law, Vol 38 pp 1-38 (1990) at p3.
74 EU food law provides for a system of traceability that enables the
recall of products for which doubts subsist as to their safety for
consumption. In the same way, consignments that are found
failing to meet the requirements must be seized or destroyed
according to the seriousness of the risk. However this does not
happen in practice. Problems are solved contractually among the
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astrous without the presence of other key factors.
First, exclusive reliance on donors’ assistance to im-
prove the institutional environment is a major im-
pediment in the upgrading process. Secondly, the
shrimp export industry was too small and too de-
pending on the EU market to attract the adequate ad-
herence from the government and the local financial
institutions.
Could one then conclude that Africa and in this
particular case Benin and the EU remain worlds
apart? As this case showed, the EU subtly asserts its
hegemony while the African state seems (given eco-
nomicpressure) tobewilling tocooperate.Theyseem
to see eye to eye as to the results of a proper food
safety law, but their challenges and local contingen-
cies are fundamentally in conflict.
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